We analyze the recovery rates of defaulted bonds in the US corporate bond market over the time period 2002 to 2010. Our data set is obtained from the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE ) database maintained by the Financial Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and provides us with a complete set of traded prices and volumes around the default events. The analysis of the microstructure of trading activity allows us to estimate reliable market-based recovery rates. We investigate the relation between these recovery rates and a comprehensive set of bond characteristics, firm fundamentals and macroeconomic variables. In addition, we explore the effect of the liquidity of the individual bonds on their traded prices after default. Our panel regression analysis explains 64% of the total variance in the recovery rates across bonds. We find that the type of default event, the seniority of the bond, and the industry in which the firm operates, are important determinants of the recovery rate. However, balance sheet ratios motivated by structural credit risk models, macroeconomic variables, and transaction costs metrics measuring liquidity, are of equal importance.
Introduction
The global financial crisis has highlighted the importance of credit risk in the pricing of financial contracts, and emphasized the multifaceted nature of its key determinants: the probability of default and the recovery rate in the event of default. Traditionally, credit risk modelling has been focused on the probability of default, while setting the recovery rate to parametric values that do not necessarily recognize its potential cross-sectional and time-series variation. However, the magnitude and variability of defaults during the crisis have emphasized the importance of obtaining more precise estimates of recovery rates, and explaining their variation across issues and issuers. It is now intuitively understood that recovery rates are potentially driven by many different factors: endogenous variables (such as specific characteristics of the assets involved and the characteristics of the firm and industry), or exogenous factors (such as overall macroeconomic conditions or market liquidity). It is important, therefore, to understand the determinants of this risk factor and to analyze their interaction effects with other dimensions of default risk.
This paper aims at investigating these relationships at the issue and issuer level for the US corporate bond market. The Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE ) database, maintained by the Financial Regulatory Authority (FINRA) , allows us to analyze, for the first time, the prices of defaulted bonds, based on a complete set of transaction data, over the time period 2002 to 2010, covering most of the period before and after the onset of the global financial crisis.
Specifically, we investigate the relation between the recovery rates and a comprehensive set of bond characteristics, firm fundamentals and macroeconomic variables based on panel data regressions. In addition, we explore the influence of market liquidity on recovery rates, an innovation in relation to the existing literature, which is largely silent on this issue.
Most credit risk instruments, such as bonds and credit default swaps (CDS), trade over-thecounter (OTC). This makes research in this area challenging, as traded prices and volumes for these instruments cannot be directly observed from a central database. Therefore, most studies have to rely, of necessity, on quotation or trade data from a particular dealer, leaving open the question of whether the data are representative of the market as a whole. This is even more of a problem for defaulted financial instruments, as their trading can often be infrequent, with stale prices, with some quotations or trades of individual dealers even "off market". However, the market for US corporate bonds is an ideal laboratory for this study as detailed data on prices and volumes are available since 2002 from the TRACE database, covering all trades following default events as well. The data not only permit a reliable estimate of a market-based recovery rate, but also provide an opportunity to study trading activity, and thus liquidity, at different stages following default.
We combine the TRACE data set with the Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database and the NYU Salomon Center Master Default Database, which allows us to study a broad set of default events capturing formal bankruptcy filings, distressed exchanges and downgrades to default status by rating agencies. Furthermore, we add firm-specific information from the Compustat Database and macroeconomic indicators from multiple sources. Overall, we cover more than 2, 000 default events for about 800 bonds, and approximately 1, 700, 000 trades in the relevant time period around default.
We make three contributions in this paper. First, we provide a detailed analysis of the microstructure of trading in defaulted bonds offering some interesting new insights. This allows us to derive reliable market-based estimates of recovery rates. Second, we analyze these recovery rates employing a broad set of explanatory variables in our regressions, in contrast to much of the literature, where the analysis has typically been more narrowly focused. Third, we include liquidity measures in our analysis of recovery rates, which turn out to be of particular importance when dealing with defaulted bonds, which are potentially illiquid.
Our analysis of recovery rates yields several distinct sets of findings. We examine the trading activity of the defaulted bonds, as defined by traded prices and volumes, 90 days before, at, and 90 days after the observed default event date. We find that although the price level is already rather low before the default event, the traded price falls significantly to its lowest level on the default day itself, around 35% of face value, on average. The price recovers, in the first 30 days following default, to about 42% of face value and shows a more volatile evolution thereafter.
1 Furthermore, we find that the trading volume of a defaulted bond is relatively high on the default event day.
This high trading activity dies down quickly within the first 30 days after default to pre-default levels. Based on these findings, we define the recovery rate of a defaulted bond as the average traded price per unit of face value, between the default day and the next 30 days after default, and thus, providing a market-based specification.
We analyze these recovery rates across bonds along various dimensions. Comparing different default event types, we find that distressed exchanges have the highest recovery rates, whereas
Chapter 11 filings result in significantly lower recoveries. This finding provides further evidence that out-of-court restructurings lead to higher recovery compared to formal bankrupcty procedures. Furthermore, we find significant differences in the performance of the default grades of the major rating agencies; in particular, the rating frameworks of Moody's and Fitch seem to incorporate recovery rate information to a greater extent.
2 Analyzing the differences in the recovery rates of corporate bonds across industries, we find that among non-financial industries, utility and energy related firms recover the most in default, while retailers recover the least. Interestingly, among financial firms, the banking and credit & financing industries recover the most in default, whereas the financial services industry recovers the least. Analyzing the seniority levels of different defaulted bonds, we find, as expected, that secured bonds recover more than unsecured and subordinated bonds. Furthermore, we document a substantial variation in recovery rates over time, e.g., we find quarterly moving averages between 20% and 80% of face value, for the time period 2002 to 2010.
In the main part of our analysis, we employ panel regressions to explain the variation in recovery rates using a comprehensive set of bond characteristics, balance sheet ratios, macroeconomic variables and liquidity measures (in addition to dummy variables, based on the default event type, industry and seniority). Overall, the regression analysis explains 64% of the total variation in the recovery rates, with all four groups of variables contributing to the explanatory power of recovery rates. Among balance sheet ratios, we find significant effects for ratios motivated by structural credit risk models, i.e., the higher the equity ratio, and the lower the default barrier, the higher the recovery rate. Furthermore, we document the direct effect of the total assets of the firm, i.e., larger firms have higher recoveries. Analyzing macroeconomic variables, we find a particularly strong effect for the market-wide default rate. Thus, we find clear evidence that a high default rate in the market as a whole, a systematic risk factor, is linked to significantly lower recovery rates of individual bonds, following default. Along the same lines, we find a positive relation between short term interest rates, an indicator of the business cycle, and recovery rates. In addition, we analyze the effect of liquidity, which is an important innovation in this paper, and find a clear link between the defined liquidity measures of bonds and their recovery rates. In particular, when measuring the transaction costs of trading using the price dispersion measure, we find that illiquid bonds with high transaction costs recover less, following default. Additional evidence of the liquidity effects is provided by the trading activity variables. Further, we find that bonds that can be delivered into a CDS contract have a significantly higher recovery rate, possibly because of buy-side pressure from protection buyers, who are required to physically deliver the underlying bond.
Overall, we provide a comprehensive analysis going beyond the results that have been presented in the prior literature. We offer detailed insights into the stochastic nature and drivers of recovery rates by analyzing a broad set of explanatory variables rather than providing evidence only on the effects of any one factor. Our results on the effects of liquidity are particularly noteworthy, since our paper is the first one, to our knowledge, to report findings on the effects of liquidity on recovery rates.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 provides details of the data used in our analysis. Section 4 states the main hypotheses that are being tested and the research questions that are being addressed. Section 5 presents the methodology and explains the setup of the subsequent analysis. Section 6 provides the descriptive analysis and the results of the panel data regressions. Section 7 concludes.
Literature Review
The literature on recovery rates can be divided into two categories: theoretical papers dealing with credit risk models, which make implicit or explicit assumptions about recoveries in default, and empirical papers analyzing past default events. Traditionally, credit risk models have been divided into structural and reduced-form models (see e.g., Altman et al. (2002) for a detailed discussion). In the basic structural models, starting with Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) , the default risk of a firm is driven by the process generating the value of its assets; hence, the risk of the firms's default is explicitly linked to the volatility of its asset value. Default occurs when the value of a firm's assets is lower than that of its liabilities at maturity. In this case, the debt holders receive the residual market value of the firm's assets. Hence, in this setup, the recovery rate, as the residual value of the defaulted company's assets, is an endogenous variable that is inversely related to the probability of default. This relation becomes even more evident when structural models are used as the basis for credit portfolio analysis (see, e.g., Frye (2000) or Gordy (2003) ), where asset values are modelled by market-wide factors and idiosyncratic factors, in which market factors lead to a negative relation between aggregate default and recovery rates.
Several authors provide extensions to the basic Merton (1974) model. 3 They generally assume that default may occur at any time between the issuance and maturity of the debt, that default is triggered when the value of the firm's assets reaches a lower threshold barrier, or that bankruptcy costs arise exogenously. Interestingly, in most of these models the recovery rate is assumed to be exogenous and independent of the firm's asset value. It is generally defined as a fixed proportion of the outstanding debt value, in terms of either face or market value, and is, therefore, independent of the probability of default.
Reduced-form models of credit risk do not condition default on the structural features of the firm (see, for example, Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), Duffie and Singleton (1997) , Lando (1998) , and Madan and Unal (1998) ). Rather, these models allow separate, explicit assumptions regarding the dynamics of both the probability of default and the recovery rate. Although a complex dependence structure can be used in such models, in principle, the recovery rate is usually assumed to be exogenous, either deterministic or stochastic, and often independent of the probability of default.
It has been well documented that neither reduced-form models (see, e.g., Longstaff et al. (2005) ) nor structural models (see, e.g., Huang and Huang (2002) ) can fully explain observed yield spreads satisfactorily. It is relevant, therefore, to understand the stochastic nature of recovery rates and provide evidence from past defaults. During the last two decades, direct attempts have been undertaken to empirically investigate the behavior of recovery rates. An important first analysis is provided by Altman and Kishore (1996) , who use a data set of over 700 defaulted bond issues from 1978 to 1995 and analyze the effect of industry affiliation on recovery rates, and conclude that the highest average recoveries come from public utilities (70%) and chemical, petroleum, and related products (63%), and that the original rating of a bond has virtually no effect on recovery, once seniority is accounted for. Hanson and Schuermann (2004) provide similar evidence for the impact of seniority and industry affiliation, when analyzing a sample of around 2,000 defaults of bonds and loans. Furthermore, they discuss the empirical distribution of recovery rates and provide evidence that recoveries are lower in recessions. Along the same lines, Altman et al. (2005) analyze the relationship at a macroeconomic level and conclude that the average annual recovery rates and default rates are indeed negatively correlated. They show that realized default rates in a particular year are important drivers of recoveries, whereas other macroeconomic variables, i.e., the performance of the economy measured by GDP or the GDP growth rate, are less predictive than most theoretical papers would suggest. Acharya et al. (2007) provide a detailed analysis of industry-wide distress and its relation to recovery rates. They argue that when an industry is in distress, defaulting firms in the industry experience lower recoveries. One mechanism causing this effect is the lower ability of the distressed firm to sell assets to competitors in the same industry, as discussed in Shleifer and Vishny (1992) .
Using a data set from 1982 to 1999, with about 800 observations, they provide evidence that the defaulted debt of industries in distress recover 10% to 15% less on average. They also document a negative effect of aggregate default rates on the recovery rate of individual issues. Furthermore, they provide evidence that balance sheet ratios, motivated by structural models, are of importance.
Altman and Kalotay (2010) provide further evidence for industry-driven effects, focusing on the modelling of the distribution of recovery rates, based on ultimate recoveries for defaulted loans and bonds.
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Additionally, Bris et al. (2006) and Davydenko and Franks (2008) provide evidence that differences in creditors' rights and reorganization practices are reflected in the level of recovery rates.
Thus, the particular default event type is of importance. They provide evidence comparing defaults across different bankrupcty procedures, e.g., Chapter 7 versus Chapter 11 filings, as well as across different countries or jurisdictions. Altman and Karlin (2009) provide further evidence of the importance of the default event by discussing distressed exchanges. They find that in distressed exchanges, recoveries are higher, compared with other default events.
Our paper extends the existing literature in new directions and provides detailed empirical evidence analyzing the driving factors of recovery rates. In contrast to prior studies, we employ market-based estimates of the recovery rates, based on a detailed analysis of the trading microstructure. Furthermore, we make use of a set of explanatory variables, which have not been analyzed in the existing literature comprehensively, but rather on a stand-alone basis, and we include liquidity measures in the analysis, which is an additional contribution. The second important data set we use is obtained from the TRACE database maintained by the FINRA, which provides transaction information such as prices and volumes for the whole universe of US corporate bonds. 6 In the US corporate bond market, reporting of any transaction 5 We exclude Chapter 7 and 15 filings, as we find almost no events where bonds are traded, after these events. Consequently, for these events, the recovery rate estimates can only be based on ultimate recovery, as in e.g. Bris et al. (2006) . 6 The reported trade volume is capped at $1 million for high yield and unrated bonds, and at $5 million for investment grade bonds. However, the exact trade volume is released by FINRA after an 18 month delay.
Data
to TRACE is obligatory for broker-dealers, and follows a set of rules approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC ), whereby all transactions must be reported within a time-frame of 15 minutes. This data source is rather unique for an OTC market since, in almost all other cases, price information must usually be obtained either from an individual dealer's trading book, which provides a very limited view of the market, or by using bid-ask quotations. We implement standard filters to exclude potential errors in TRACE.
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We match the default events with the individual bonds affected by the respective event, within the time window starting 90 days before default, and ending 90 days after the default event.
However, some minimum requirements must be fulfilled for a bond to be included in our analysis.
We do not include bonds with an amount issued smaller than $10 million. We exclude from our sample bonds with complex structures, mostly related to embedded derivative features, since the prices of bonds with such payoff structures are quite different, and could potentially bias the analysis. In particular, therefore, we drop bonds that are rating-sensitive, convertible, sinkable, extendible, structured, or posses any other kind of complex optionality. Thus, the bonds included for our analysis are either straight bonds, or simply puttable or callable. Matching the TRACE data-set with the default events results in 2, 235 event/bond combinations, covering 818 bonds issued by 259 firms, and account for approximately 1, 734, 000 trades, with an aggregate volume of $500 billion.
We add bond and firm characteristics from Bloomberg, covering the amount issued, maturity, coupon, industry and seniority level, where we group the bonds into four main categories of seniority: guaranteed, secured, unsecured and subordinated. Furthermore, we match the data-set with data from Markit.
8 This allows us to identify bonds that can be delivered to settle credit default swaps (CDS). In addition, we match the data-set with balance sheet and income statement information obtained from Compustat. This permits us to analyze the effect of balance sheet ratios, motivated by various models for recovery rates. We retrieve macroeconomic data covering interest rates (US Federal Funds rate and Treasury yields) from Bloomberg, to assess the impact of overall economic conditions on the level of recovery rates. The final combined data-set allows to assess the impact of several groups of variables on the level of recovery rates in a comprehensive manner.
7 Dick-Nielsen (2009) provides an extensive description of possible reporting errors, and its implications for liquidity analysis. Such errors include (i) trade corrections within the same day, (ii) trade cancelations within the same day, and (iii) reversals across days, i.e., a mistake that had not been detected on the traded day. Furthermore, we implement price filters eliminating potentially erroneous reported prices.
8 Markit provides consensus valuations of credit default swaps (CDS) across different maturities and restructuring clauses.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
In this section, we discuss the research questions we address and the hypotheses that we test in this paper. In particular, we consider the underlying trading activity of defaulted bonds and focus on the potential effects of bond characteristics, firm fundamentals, macroeconomic indicators, and liquidity measures on the level of recovery rates.
The microstructure of the trading activity of defaulted bonds allows us to analyze interesting research questions relating to how bond prices, trading volumes and number of trades evolve in different stages of default, and how a reliable market-based recovery rate can be estimated. We examine the trading activity of the defaulted bonds 90 days before, at, and 90 days after the observed default event date. In particular, we search for a "grace period" after the default event, during which prices are mainly driven by the effects of the default event itself, and test whether the trading activity levels are significantly different before and after this window. Furthermore, we analyze the trading microstructure of various sub-samples based on industry, rating and default event type and compare the trading activity of the defaulted bonds with previous studies of nondefaulted bonds. It turns out that a grace period of 30 days is optimal in the definition of recovery rates, i.e., we use the average traded price of a bond between the default day and the next 30 days after default to compute its recovery rate (see Section 6).
In the main part of our analysis, we explore the time-series and cross-sectional variations of the recovery rates along various dimensions. First, we focus on three aspects that were found to be of importance in the previous literature: default event type, industry and seniority. Starting with the default event type, we cover the full range of default events from formal bankruptcy to informal unlikely-to-pay events. We test the hypothesis that formal procedures are a sign of more severe economic problems within a firm, and lead to higher costs to bondholders than informal procedures. Therefore, we anticipate that Chapter 11 filings have lower recoveries than distressed exchanges and rating defaults. Furthermore, we expect that default ratings have lower recoveries than unlikely-to-pay ratings. As for industry affiliation, we would expect that within non-financial industries, utility and energy firms should recover more than other industries as reported by various studies (see Section 2), due to their higher proportions of tangible assets.
Similarly, among financial firms, commercial banks should recover more than investment banks, possibly because of their larger holdings of liquid assets. As for the seniority of the bonds, we hypothesize that the greater the seniority and collateral value of their assets, the higher the recovery rate.
Going beyond these simple dimensions, we analyze the effects of bond characteristics, firm characteristics, macroeconomic variables and liquidity variables on recovery rates. The potential effects of bond characteristics, such as amount issued, maturity, coupon, rating grade one year before default and CDS availability, on recovery rates address interesting research questions. In particular, we conjecture that larger bond issues recover more, since they offer greater liquidity, and bonds with longer maturities recover less, since bonds with a maturity of over ten years are often held by buy-and-hold investors, such as insurance companies, and are either illiquid or are sold in large blocks upon default. We expect the coupon rate to be positively related to the recovery rate, since a higher coupon is of value to the bondholders for certain outcomes of the default event. Regarding the rating grade one year before default, we hypothesize that the lower the rating grade, the lower would be the recovery rate. Furthermore, we expect a higher recovery rate if the bond is deliverable into a CDS contract, as it may generate greater demand upon default, from protection buyers, compared to non-insurable bonds.
The characteristics of the firm are likely to determine the level of recovery rates. We hypothesize that the value of equity and the default barrier affect recoveries as suggested by structural models of credit risk: the lower the equity and the higher the default barrier, the lower the recovery of debtholders, given a certain drop in the firm's asset value, triggering default. Furthermore, we test whether the earnings, tangible assets, receiveables, or firm size, before the default event, matter.
Macroeconomic variables, such as aggregate default rates and information based on interest rate curves, are generally expected to have a significant impact on the level of recovery rates, since both are indicators of the overall economic conditions. In particular, we expect that a high level of the (aggregate) default rate in the overall economy signals that the economic conditions are poor and, thus, could lead to lower recovery rates for individual firms. Similarly, when the (short-term) interest rates are low, the economy is at the lower end of the business cycle with lower recovery rates. We also investigate the impact of the slope of the interest rate term structure on recoveries.
Furthermore, our detailed data-set allows us, for the first time, to estimate liquidity measures, such as trading activity variables (volume and number of trades) and transaction costs measures (Amihud measure and price dispersion measure) for defaulted bonds. We test the hypothesis that less liquid bonds have lower recovery rates. We expect that the liquidity effects on prices that have been extensively documented in the literature on non-defaulted bonds (see, e.g., Bao et al. (2011 ), Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012 and Friewald et al. (2012) ) would be exacerbated following default.
Methodology
This section outlines the general approach to measuring the determinants of recovery rates in the US corporate bond market. We present here our definitions of the recovery rate and the various types of bond characteristics, firm fundamentals, macroeconomic variables and liquidity measures, which are used to explain the level of bond recoveries (see Section 4). We also present the panel data regression setup that we use in our analysis.
Recovery Rate
The recovery rate π of a bond i issued by firm j is defined in our analysis as the mean of the transaction prices p, per 100 of face value, between the default day t and the subsequent T = 30 days after default. If K i,j,s is the number of trades of bond i of firm j on day s indexed by k i,j,s , then
Thus, this specification of the recovery rate suggests that the level of π i,j,t can be interpreted as what a buyer (seller) would have to pay (receive), on average, and hence, in expectation,
given that a default event occurred, and given that the transaction takes place within the time window between the default day and the next 30 days after default. It should be noted that the accrued interest is set to zero, as most defaulted bonds are traded flat, i.e., without exchange of accrued interest; thus, all prices under investigation are "clean" rather than "dirty" prices. The specification presented above represents a market-based definition of the recovery rate, in which a certain grace period is considered. We will further elaborate on our definition based on the analysis of the transaction data in Section 6.
Bond Characteristics
We use a set of bond characteristics to explain differences in the recovery rates of corporate bonds. The most basic information available about a bond consists of its amount issued, maturity and coupon. In addition, we consider the seniority level, which is, of course, very important when analyzing recovery rates. Specifically, in this paper, we use four different levels of seniority: (i) guaranteed, (ii) secured, (iii) unsecured and (iv) subordinated.
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Bond ratings from Fitch, Standard and Poor's and Moody's, one year before the default events are retrieved and are mapped to natural numbers, e.g., AAA = 1, AA+ = 2, . . . , D = 21. With
this data, we can analyze whether the rating grade before the default event is of importance in the determination of the recovery rate, i.e., we can compare "expected" vs. "unexpected" credit events. Additionally, we collect the information about whether the bond is deliverable into a CDS contract and, hence, is insurable in the CDS market. We consider this a bond-specific event,
since only a selected list of bonds of a particular firm can be delivered into its CDS contract. For example, if only CDS for unsecured debt are traded for a firm, subordinated bonds cannot be insured.
Firm Fundamentals
We employ certain firm characteristics in our analysis. First, we use the industry in which the firm operates as an important characteristic. Second, we use balance sheet and income statement information as explanatory variables, which is available for the fiscal year prior to the default event. We use the following six accounting ratios, which are directly motivated by structural credit risk models (see Section 2): We use the value of equity over total assets as a general indicator of the financial condition of the firm. 10 The value of equity is used in many structural credit risk models to infer the asset value of the company and also to define the leverage. Furthermore, we use the default barrier as defined by Moody's KMV and widely used in structural credit risk modelling, i.e., in assessing the distance to default measure of firms. In addition, we define LTD issuance as the ratio of long term debt to total debt, since long-term debt is regarded as a more stable funding source and less likely to cause default in the short run. We measure profitability using the EBITDA as motivated by structural models based on cashflows. In addition, we use intangible assets and receivables over total asset as ratios that are indicative of the potential irrecoverable proportions of assets.
Finally, we use total assets and number of employees as size proxies for firms.
Macroeconomic Variables
We consider three different macroeconomic indicators: the aggregate (market-wide) default rate, the Federal Funds rate and slope of the term structure of interest rates. The aggregate default rate, at time t, is defined as the fraction of defaulted bonds in relation to the total outstanding bonds in the whole US corporate bond market, in the time interval between day t, and T = 90 days before t.
Aggregate Default Rate t,T = Defaulted Bonds t,t−T Outstanding Bonds t,t−T
We consider the aggregate default rate on the default event day in our analysis. In addition, we consider the Federal Funds rate on the default event day as the relevant short term interest rate, to avoid issues of default risk and illiquidity, particularly after the financial crisis. We define the slope of the yield curve on the default event day as the difference between the Federal Funds rate and the ten year US Treasury yield.
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10 In a few cases, we replace the market value of equity by the book value of equity, when reliable data were not available for the former.
11 We tried alternative measures of the short term interest rate and the slope of the term structure as explanatory variables. However, the results are basically identical and we report only the results of the definitions above.
Liquidity Measures
As we have all the necessary transaction data available, we can define various liquidity proxies that we use as additional explanatory variables. We employ simple trading activity variables, e.g., volume and the number of trades, and more sophisticated liquidity measures, e.g., the Amihud and price dispersion measures, that have been used in literature (see e.g. Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012) and Friewald et al. (2012) ). We use the time window between the default day t and T = 30 days after this day for the estimation of the measures.
Volume. The volume variable, v i,j,s , is the average transaction volume, per trade, of bond i, of firm j, within the default day t, and T = 30 days after this day:
Number of trades. This variable, n i,j,t , is the average number of trades of bond i, of firm j, between the default day t, and T = 30 days after this day:
Amihud measure. The Amihud measure (Amihud (2002)) of bond i, of firm j, on day s, given N i,j,s observed daily returns r indexed by k i,j,s is defined as:
This measure, based on Kyle (1985) , originally designed for limit order markets, assesses the price impact of the traded volume, and hence the depth of the market. Intuitively, a market is considered illiquid, if a low transaction volume causes relatively large price changes.
Price Dispersion. Similar to Jankowitsch et al. (2011) and Friewald et al. (2012) , we define the price dispersion, d i,j,s , of bond i, of firm j, on day s, as:
where m i,j,s is the mean transaction price representing the fair value of the bond, and p i,j,s are the individual trade prices. The (volume-weighted) volatility of the individual trades around the fair value permits a direct estimation of transaction costs based on transaction data. The intuition behind this measure is motivated by market microstructure models: a low dispersion of traded prices around its market wide valuation indicates that the bond can be bought or sold close to its fair value and, thus, at lower transaction costs, indicative of a more liquid instrument.
Panel Data Regression
We rely on a panel data regression approach to analyze the determinants of recovery rates in the US corporate bond market. As motivated by the discussion in the previous section, the recovery rate π of bond i, issued by firm j, for default at day t, is assumed to be given by:
This specification is tested on a pooled data-set that combines the entire time-series and the cross-section of recovery rates. We use ordinary least squares regressions adjusting the standard errors for the existence of default event-firm clusters as described in Williams (2000) and Petersen (2009) . This approach addresses the issue that in a particular default event a firm may have several bonds outstanding, and that all these defaulted bonds show up as separate observations in our data. In addition, all our regressions include the default event, industry and seniority dummy variables.
Results

Descriptive Analysis
This section analyzes the underlying trading activity of defaulted bonds in the US corporate bond market and presents descriptive statistics for the resulting recovery rates. We first explore the traded prices and volumes on the default day, and in the 90 days windows before and after default. Focusing on the recovery rate itself, we analyze its empirical distribution and quantify the effects of the default event type, industry and seniority on the recovery rates. We also document the variation in recovery rates over time. In addition, we provide summary statistics for the explanatory variables that are used in the panel data regressions.
Trading Microstructure of Defaulted Bonds
In this section, we analyze the underlying trading activity of defaulted bonds. trading volume in defaulted bonds per day. By investigating transaction prices, we find that the lowest mean price is observed on the default day itself, and is around 35% of face value. The price level 90 days before the default is already low and shows a declining trend from about 57% to 45%. However, the default event day witnesses a significant drop in prices and is, thus, not fully anticipated by the market. Interestingly, we find that the transaction prices recover steadily to 42%, in the ensuing 30 days after default, whereas the prices after 30 days show a more volatile evolution. Using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, we find that the transaction prices within the 90 day window before default are significantly different from those on the default day itself, and in the subsequent 30 days, which are, in turn, significantly different from those in the time frame of 31 to 90 days after default.
The analysis of the mean number of trades and traded volume across all default event/bond combinations exhibits interesting patterns. In particular, the average number of trades per bond on the default day of around 35 is significantly higher than on all other days. This number of trades is also remarkably high, compared to the market-wide average of the whole corporate bond market of 3 to 4 trades per day per bond (see, for example, Friewald et al. (2012) ). The number of trades decreases rapidly in the subsequent 30 days after default to around 8 to 10 trades per day per bond, which is still higher than the market-wide average. The average daily traded volume per bond is around $10 million on the default day, and decreases to the same extent as the number of trades to about $3 million. Again, the traded volume on the default day is higher than the market-wide average of around $5 million, see e.g. Friewald et al. (2012) . Overall, we find a lower price and higher level of trading activity on the default day. This price on the default day recovers quickly in the next 30 days, reaching a stable price level, with the trading activity returning to pre-default levels thereafter. Based on these findings, we define the recovery rate in our analysis as the mean transactions price in the window between the default date, and 30 days after default, as we find evidence that the price discovery in this time window is driven mostly by the default event itself. Furthermore, this time window represents a reasonable period to split up and sell larger positions in defaulted bonds. We consider this estimation of a market-based recovery rate more reliable than quotations or last-trade information from the default date alone, as has been used by many prior studies due to data limitations. This significant methodological distinction makes our subsequent analysis all the more robust. Second, trading activity is especially high on the default day and gradually declines afterwards.
By comparing non-financial and financial firms, we find that for non-financial firms, the price decline leading towards the default day is smoother, and the price decline on the default day itself is less severe (from 43% to 35%, compared to 47% to 33% for financials), indicating that the actual default is more of a surprise to the market, in the case of financial firms. For both groups, the number of trades and the traded volume are especially high on the default day. In addition, the general level of trading activity around default seems to be higher for financial firms than for nonfinancial firms, e.g., the mean number of trades is around 22 for non-financial firms, compared to around 70 for financial firms, on the default day. The comparison of investment versus speculative grade bonds yields interesting insights, as well. While the mean transaction prices for speculative grade bonds decline gradually towards default, prices drop rather steeply on the default day in the case of investment grade bonds (from 42% to 35% compared to 47% to 27%). This might indicate a greater surprise element in the case of default for more credit-worthy, investment grade bonds.
The number of trades and traded volumes are higher for investment grade bonds, as expected.
Figure 3 presents mean transaction prices 90 days before, and after, default for the different default event types. Transaction prices for Chapter 11 liquidation and restructuring filings exhibit very similar patterns. In both cases, the default day induces a relatively sharp decline in prices from about 50% down to 25%. Within the first 30 days after default, prices recover to around 40%. Especially interesting is the analysis of mean transaction prices in the case of distressed exchanges. The pattern reveals that these cases are the only default events where transaction prices before default are lower than after default, indicating that the default itself is seen as a sign of relief by the market, after an uncertain negotiation process. In particular, distressed exchanges exhibit the highest transaction prices in the post-event phase. For rating-based default events, we find that unlikely-to-pay announcement events by all rating agencies lead to a sharp drop of prices, indicating an element of surprise, whereas the event of downgrading to an actual default rating class seems to be generally anticipated by the market. The analysis of the number of trades and traded volumes for different default event types yields very similar results, compared to the previous analyses, and is, therefore, not presented in the interest of conserving space.
Recovery Rates and Effects of Event Type, Industry and Seniority
Analyzing the resulting recovery rates, i.e., the mean transaction prices between the default day, and 30 days after default, we first present the empirical distribution of the recovery rates of defaulted US corporate bonds between 2002 and 2010, in Figure 4 . The mean recovery rate is equal to 38.6% with a standard deviation of 27.4%. While the mean recovery rate is close to the 40% estimate provided by Altman and Kishore (1996) , which is widely used in academia and industry, the standard deviation around this number suggests substantial variation in recovery rates across different dimensions; therefore, a comprehensive analysis of the driving factors is important. Specifically, three peaks can be identified in the empirical distribution -one up to 20%, one between 40% to 50% and one between 60% to 70%. The lowest peak is likely to have been driven by the recovery rates of bonds issued by Lehman Brothers, which traded at about 15%, after filing for protection under Chapter 11 on September 15, 2008. Overall, the distribution documents the stochastic nature of the recovery rate. We present summary statistics in Table 2 Panel C displays recovery rates across non-financial industries, while panel D reports recovery rates for financial firms. One should note that the sample is fairly balanced between non-financial and financial firms (1, 160 observations belong to non-financial firms, while 1, 075 belong to financial firms). We find that among non-financial industries, utility and energy firms recover, on average, the highest (e.g., electricity 48% and oil & gas 44.4%), while retail firms recover the least at 33.4%. Among financial industries, we find that the overall highest recovery rate of 56.6%
is reported for the credit & financing industry, while the financial services industry exhibits the lowest recovery rates -this result is mainly driven by the low recoveries of Lehman Brothers debt.
The averages across financial firms (38.8%) and non-financial firms (38.5%) are almost identical, while the standard deviations are high in every industry group.
Panel E displays the average recovery rates across seniority levels. As expected, secured bonds recover, on average, the most (around 49.3%), while bonds that are subordinated recover, on average, the least (around 15.1%). Interestingly, we find only a small difference in recovery rates between guaranteed (40.3%) and unsecured bonds (39.1%). This can arise possibly due to guarantees provided to bonds of subsidiaries by the holding company, making the guarantee worthless in case of default of the holding company. Figure 6 displays the average recovery rates by rating class, one year before default. Interestingly, no consistent pattern emerges from an inspection of the figure. Surprisingly, bonds with A+, A or A− ratings, one year before default, have rather low recoveries, following default. Thus, rather unexpected events, which cause erstwhile highly rated firms to default, seem to result in lower recoveries. However, when only rating grades from BBB+ to C are considered, a slight tendency for lower recoveries for lower rated bonds can be discerned.
Summary Statistics of Explanatory Variables
The previous analysis shows a pattern of significant cross-sectional and time-series variation of recovery rates, which might be explained by a more detailed analysis of a comprehensive set of explanatory variables. 12 Table 3 reports the summary statistics for the main explanatory variables in our empirical analysis, covering bond characteristics, firm fundamentals and liquidity proxies. Table 4 provides the same statistics, for the sub-samples of non-financial and financial firms. We first discuss the results of the full sample and then highlight the differences between non-financial and financial firms.
Panel A of Table 3 summarizes the results for the bond characteristics: the average issue size of defaulted bonds is $400 million. The average maturity and coupon rate are 6.82 years and 7.48% respectively. The average bond rating one year before default is BB, i.e., most of defaulting bonds are from the speculative grades. All these variables show considerable variation, e.g., the standard deviation of the credit rating is five notches. Interestingly, we find that for financial firms, the average bond rating is A− (investment grade), while for non-financial firms, the average bond rating is B− (speculative grade), indicating that the default of a financial firm is often not 12 See Section 5 for a detailed description of the explanatory variables.
considered as very likely by rating agencies one year before the actual event, whereas for nonfinancial firms, the economic situation of the company is already perceived as being weak. A similar difference with a parallel reasoning can be found for the coupon rate (financial firms: 5.8%
vs. non-financial firms: 8.6%). Furthermore, defaulted financial bonds have, on average, a longer maturity by 2.5 years.
Panel B in Table 3 presents statistics for firm fundamentals. On average, firms have an equity ratio of 6.62% of total assets. The average default barrier equals 47.80% of total assets. Comparing financial and non-financial firms in Table 4 , we find that there is only a small difference in the equity ratio between these two groups. Interestingly, the default barrier is higher for financial firms (around 53%) than for non-financial firms (around 23%), indicating that the former use more short-term financing. On average, receivables are 50% of total assets for financial firms, but only 10% are for non-financial firms. There is also a huge gap in intangibility: for non-financial firms, intangibility is ten times as high as for financial firms. Despite being close to default, financial firms seem to be highly profitable, on average, with a profitability of around 60%. Analyzing the size proxies, the average firm size is equal to $139 billion with 2,970 employees, respectively. While the average firm size of defaulted financial firms is ten times as large as that of non-financial firms, the latter have 2.2 times as many employees as financial firms.
Panel C in Table 3 summarizes the trading activity variables and liquidity measures. The trading activity variables confirm that the number of trades and trading volume are above the market-wide average and, thus, the market for defaulted bonds is not an obviously illiquid segment of the corporate bond market for all measures. Interestingly, bonds of financial firms have five trades per day on average more compared to non-financial firms. However, the volume per trade is much lower (around $260,000 vs. $470,000). Analyzing the liquidity measures, we find that trading in defaulted bonds results in relatively high transaction costs. Thus, defaulted bonds are illiquid in this sense. The average price impact given by the Amihud measure of $1 million is 1.49%, while the market-wide average is at 0.36% (see Friewald et al. (2012) ). Transaction costs amount to 2.80%, estimated by the price dispersion measure, which is six times as high as the overall market average of 0.43% (see Friewald et al. (2012) ). during the financial crisis experienced the highest aggregate default rate, around 3.60%. We find a significant variation in default rates during our observation period, allowing us to analyze the relation between recovery and default rates. The Federal Funds rate shows similar patterns, but in the opposite direction, i.e., low rates in crisis periods, and high rates in the boom phases. The difference between the 10 year Treasury rate and the Federal Funds rate shows large differences at the end of crisis, and low or negative differences at the beginning of crisis, whereas the 10 year rate itself is rather stable over time, albeit with a decrease since the financial crisis, due to central bank intervention, through quantitative easing.
Panel Data Analysis
In this section, we present the results of the panel regressions. The recovery rates are explained by bond characteristics, firm fundamentals, macroeconomic variables and liquidity proxies, as well as dummy variables for the default event types, industries and seniority classes. The results of this model specification are presented in the next section. Additionally, we provide an alternative empirical analysis. In particular, we test the model on two subsamples, i.e., for non-financial and speculative grade rated bonds, to analyze whether our results are driven by either financial firms or by firms that were hitherto investment grade, but defaulted subsequently. 
Regression Model Explaining Recovery Rates
In this section, we present the results of our regression analysis. Table 5 presents six different regression specifications. Model 1 represents a regression including only the dummy variables for the default event types, industries and seniority levels. This specification allows to explore the increase in explanatory power compared to the other specifications. We find an adjusted R 2 of 37% for Model 1, i.e., reasonable explanatory power can be found even for this specification, as important dimensions are already included and the results of the descriptive analysis can be confirmed. The next four specifications, i.e., Models 2 to 5, control for each of the four defined groups of variables, i.e., bond characteristics, firm fundamentals, macroeconomic variables or 13 See Friewald et al. (2012) for a related analysis on the different regimes in the US corporate bond market.
14 In addition, we perform a factor analysis and identify five factors representing a balance sheet factor, a size factor, a macroeconomic factor, a trading activity factor and a transaction costs factor, and run the regressions (joint model and subsamples) afresh based on these factors to avoid potential multi-collinearity. The results based on the factors confirm the overall findings (sign and significance) and are, thus, not presented in detail.
liquidity proxies. We find that all four groups add to the explanation of recovery rates. Bond characteristics (Model 2) increase the adjusted R 2 by five percentage points to 42%. However, these characteristics are not as important as the other groups. Firm fundamentals (Model 3) and macroeconomic variables (Model 4) seem to be of similar importance, as they exhibit adjusted R 2 of 47% and 46% respectively. We obtain the highest adjusted R 2 of 53% by including liquidity measures (Model 5). Thus, the trading activity and liquidity measures are important additional variables necessary to explain recovery rates.
Model 6 in Table 5 includes all four sets of variables. We focus on this complete model to discuss the effect of the individual variables. We find that this model is able to capture 64% of the variation of recovery rates. Among the bond characteristics, four variables turn out to be significant. As expected, we find a positive association between the amount issued and the recovery rate, i.e., bonds with higher amounts outstanding trade at favorable prices post-default.
A $10 million increase in amount issued is associated with a 2.85% increase in recoveries per 100% of face value, which represents an economically significant effect. We find that bonds with a longer maturity exhibit lower recoveries, i.e., an increase in the time to maturity by one year decreases the recovery rate by around 0.6% of face value. Thus, this effect has rather low economic impact, and might be caused by selling-pressure imposed by large institutional investors, such as insurance companies, which typically hold bonds with longer time to maturity, but may be forced to sell following default, due to mandate restrictions. Furthermore, we find a small positive effect for the coupon rate, potentially indicating that bonds with a higher coupon are of higher value for certain outcomes of the default event. Interestingly, the rating variable is insignificant in the complete model, indicating that the rating one year before the default event conveys little information concerning the recovery rate. This result is consistent with the findings of Altman and Kishore (1996) . The most interesting result among the bond characteristics is provided by the CDS dummy, indicating whether a bond can be delivered into a CDS contract. In particular, we find that bonds that are deliverable into a CDS contract exhibit around 6.70% higher recovery rates of face value than bonds that are non-deliverable. This effect is quite significant in economic terms, and may arise due to the potential buy-side pressure of protection buyers, who are obliged to deliver certain bonds to protection sellers in the case of default.
Among the firm characteristics, we find significant effects for the ratios motivated by structural credit risk models. We find that the higher the equity value and the lower the default barrier, the higher the recovery. In particular, we find roughly similar partial net effects of these two ratios, i.e., an increase in the equity ratio and a decrease in the default barrier by ten percentage points, increases the recovery by around 1.50% and 1.80% respectively. In addition, we find that firm size matters, i.e., a $100 billion increase in total assets leads to an increase in recoveries by approximately 3.60%. The other firm characteristics employed (long term debt issuance, intangibility, receivables, profitability, and employees) are statistically insignificant in the joint model. Thus, the information from these characteristics might be already contained in the industry dummies.
The third group of explanatory variables are macroeconomic characteristics, of which the most important one is the aggregate (market-wide) default rate. Several studies (see e.g., Altman et al. (2002) ) have concluded that aggregate default rates and aggregate recovery rates are negatively associated. As already mentioned in Section 5, we employ a more precise estimate of the aggregate default rate; based on the default event date, we derive for each recovery rate a market-wide default rate in a trailing 90 day window, to be able to measure the contemporaneous interaction effect between these two variables. In addition, we consider the Federal Funds rate on the default event date as the relevant short term rate and we explore the slope between the 10 year Treasury rate and this short term interest rate. All three variables are highly statistically significant. In particular, we find that high aggregate default rates and low short term interest rates imply lower recoveries.
Thus, as expected, poor overall economic conditions result in lower recovery rates, i.e., an increase in the market-wide default rate, and a decrease in the short term interest rates by one percentage point leads to a decrease in recoveries by around 4.60%, and 6.60% respectively. In addition, we find a positive effect of the slope factor, i.e., in regimes that could be associated with higher optimism, we observe higher recoveries. Overall, as expected, systematic risk factors such as the market-wide default risk influences the level of recoveries. The high explanatory power of the model points to the fact that a significant part of the variation in recovery rates can be attributed to this market-wide risk factor.
The fourth group of explanatory variables consists of the liquidity measures (volume, number of trades, Amihud measure and price dispersion measure). We find that liquidity effects are of particular importance in explaining the variation of recovery rates across different bonds in default. In particular, the price dispersion measure introduced by Jankowitsch et al. (2011) is highly significant and exhibits a negative coefficient -indicating that illiquid bonds suffer more of a decline in the event of default than liquid bonds. In particular, we find that an increase in the price dispersion measure by 100 basis points leads to a decrease in recovery rates by around 5.05%.
The trading activity variable and the volume variable turn out to be insignificant, indicating that pure trading activity itself has virtually no impact on recovery rates; rather, transaction cost metrics seem to be of greater importance. Interestingly, the Amihud measure is insignificant and, thus, fails to provide explanatory power in addition to the price disperion measure.
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Overall, we find important factors driving the recovery rates of corporate bonds following default. As expected, bond characteristics are of minor importance. However, we document the strong effect of deliverability (into the CDS contract) on the recovery rate. On the other hand, firm characteristics motivated by structural credit risk models and macroeconomic variables are clearly linked to recovery rates. Interestingly, liquidity variables, especially those proxies that measure transaction costs, are significant factors in explaining recovery rates.
Non-Financial and Speculative Grade Bonds
In this section, we present the results for two important subsamples of our overall data-set. This analysis allows to validate the results of the previous section and to analyze whether certain results are potentially driven by financial firms (especially, Lehman Brothers) or by large investment grade firms. Table 6 provides the results for non-financial (Model 1) and speculative grade bonds (Model 2). We find an adjusted R 2 of around 54% for these two subsamples. Analyzing the effects of the individual variables, we again find similar results, i.e., all groups of characteristics add to the explanatory power and most variables that are significant in the overall model are again so. Thus, the main results stay much the same for these sub-groups as the overall sample.
However, some interesting differences compared to the overall sample need to be highlighted.
Among the bond characteristics, the partial effect of maturity (around −0.96%) is more negative for both non-financial and speculative grade bonds, i.e., longer maturity bonds recover less in the two subsamples as compared to the full sample (around −0.61%). The amount issued and coupon are of minor importance, potentially indicating that bonds of these samples are more similar compared to the full sample, in this respect. Interestingly, the rating variable is significant for both samples, i.e., a one notch downgrade is associated with approximately a 1.45% decrease in recoveries for non-financial and speculative grade bonds. Thus, once the low recoveries that we observe in the A+, A and A− rating grade are disregarded, we find the expected result that a lower rating grade one year before the default indicates lower recovery. The option to deliver the bond into a CDS contract reveals interesting insights in these two subsamples. While for non-financial bonds, the possibility of delivering the bond into the CDS contract still results in significantly higher recovery rates, the coefficient is insignificant for speculative grade bonds, perhaps indicating that CDS contracts for these firms are often illiquid before an expected default event.
As for firm characteristics, we find similar results in the subset-regressions, compared to the overall sample. We find that the partial effects of equity and the default barrier become stronger for both of these groups, compared to those for the full sample. In addition, receiveables and number of employees seem to matter for non-financial firms and speculative grade bonds. Specifically, a one percentage point increase in receivables is associated with an increase in recoveries of around 0.21% to 0.27% for these two sub-groups. This effect could not be detected in the overall sample, possibly because of the higher percentage of receivables for financial firms. Additionally, an increase in the number of employees by 1000 leads to an increase of recoveries for these two groups by around 0.61%.
The significance and directional effects of macroeconomic variables remain basically unchanged in the sub-samples compared to the full sample. Further interesting insights can be obtained from the liquidity measures. For the transaction cost measures (both Amihud and price dispersion metrics), we find results similar to those for the full sample. The effect of the price dispersion measure is more pronounced in these two subsets, i.e., an increase in transaction costs by 100 basis points is associated with a decrease in recoveries by 7.7% to 8.8%, indicating that illiquidity effects are of particular importance for non-financial and speculative grade bonds in explaining the variation across bond recoveries. Interestingly, the trading activity variables (volume and number of trades) are significant in the subsets as well. The volume variable has a negative impact, whereas the number of trades has a positive effect. This could indicate that a large trading volume in a bond with only a few observed trades has a negative impact on its recovery rate following default.
Such an effect cannot be found in the results for the overall sample, as (large) financial firms and investment grade firms have potentially more active trading after default, even when recoveries are lower for other reasons (e.g., Lehman Brothers).
Conclusion
The recovery rate in the event of default is an important risk factor for pricing financial contracts exposed to credit risk. Many defaults during the recent past have highlighted the stochastic nature of recovery rates. Therefore, it is important to understand the determinants of this risk factor in greater detail.
In this paper, we analyze recovery rates of defaulted US corporate bonds, based on a complete set of transactions data over the time period 2002 to 2010.
In particular, we investigate the underlying trading activity for a broad set of default event types
and provide reliable market-based estimates of the recovery rates. The focus of our analysis is on the relation between these recovery rates and a comprehensive set of bond characteristics, firm fundamentals and macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, we use measures quantifying the liquidity effects for individual bonds, an additional innovation relative to the prior literature.
Analyzing the microstructure of the trading activity reveals that the lowest bond prices indeed occur on default event day itself (around 35% of face value, on average). Interestingly, the trading activity on this day, measured by volume and number of trades, is quite high in comparison with non-defaulted bonds. The prices recover to around 42% in the following 30 days after default with the trading activity still remaining high. Thereafter, prices show a more volatile evolution and the trading activity dies down quickly. Based on these findings, we define the recovery rate of a defaulted bond as the average traded price between the default day and the next 30 days after default, as we conjecture that price discovery in this time window is mostly driven by the default event itself.
The subsequent panel regression analysis explains 64% of the total variation in recovery rates employing bond characteristics, firm fundamentals, macroeconomic variables and liquidity measures as explanatory variables. As expected, we find that the type of default event, the industry in which the firm operates, and the seniority, are important determinants of the recovery rate.
However, of equal importance are balance sheet ratios motivated by structural credit risk models and overall macroeconomic conditions. Furthermore, we find that transaction costs metrics and trading activity variables measuring liquidity are important determinants of recovery rates. In summary, we provide a comprehensive analysis offering detailed insights into the stochastic nature of recovery rates and quantify the effects of various endogenous and exogenous factors on recovery rates. (restructuring and liquidation), distressed exchanges and rating downgrades from the three major rating agencies, i.e., Fitch Moody's, and Standard and Poor's.
Figures and Tables
Type Description
Chapter 11 liquidation If a business is unable to service its debt or pay its creditors, either the business itself or any of its creditors can file with a federal bankruptcy court for protection under Chapter 11. As the debtor in possession the trustee may liquidiate the assets of the firm.
Chapter 11 restructuring If a business is unable to service its debt or pay its creditors, either the business itself or any of its creditors can file with a federal bankruptcy court for protection under Chapter 11. As the debtor in possession the trustee may restructure the firm.
Distressed exchange Debtor proposes a fundamental change in the contractual commitments to creditors who may voluntarily agree. This table reports the summary statistics of bond characteristics (Panel A), firm fundamentals (Panel B) and liquidity proxies (Panel C) separated in non-financial firms and financial firms. We report the mean, standard deviation (SD) and number of observations (N). Amount issued is given in millions, maturity in years, coupon in percent of notional and ratings are mapped onto natural numbers, e.g. AAA = 1, AA+ = 2, . . . , D = 21. Equity, default barrier, intangibility, receiveables are given in percent of total assets, LTD issuance in percent of total debt and profitability in percent of total sales. Total assets are given in $100 billions, employees in 1, 000. Volume is given in $100, 000. Amihud measure represents a price change in percent based on $1 million of volume and price dispersion is given in percent. The data-set consists of transaction data reported by TRACE for the period 
